The Review of Economic Performance and Social Progress 2001: The Longest Decade: Canada in the 1990s by Keith Banting et al.
1
T
he 1990s was a long decade in Canada.
It was a period of transitions and tur-
bulence, of seismic shifts in the
Canadian economy and dramatic changes in
many longstanding public programs. It was
also a decade in which Canadians’ attitudes
toward their economic future and their
expectations of government seemed to evolve
in new and uncharted directions.
The 1990s were years of economic con-
trasts. The decade began with a deep, pro-
longed recession marked by the highest
average rate of unemployment since the
1930s, yet it ended with the return of strong
economic growth. Underneath the valleys and
peaks of a particularly intense economic cycle,
however, the basic structure of the Canadian
economy was being reshaped in powerful ways
by forces felt around the world, such as trade
liberalization, globalization and technological
change. Many of these structural trends had
roots in earlier years or decades, but their full
impact became clear in the 1990s, and
Canadians had to embrace new ways of think-
ing about their economic and social future.
The 1990s also saw major changes in
public policy. Most importantly, the basic
strategy guiding macroeconomic policy shifted
dramatically. Monetary authorities adopted
price stability as their primary objective, pro-
ducing restrictive inflation targets and high
interest rates compared to many other coun-
tries. Fiscal policy was also tightened sharply,
as federal and provincial governments moved
aggressively to eliminate longstanding deficits,
mainly through deep cuts to public expendi-
tures. In the case of the federal government, its
program expenditures as a proportion of GDP
fell to levels not seen since the late 1940s. In
addition, important components of social pol-
icy were restructured. Although the origins of
many these changes can be traced to earlier
years, the pace of change accelerated over the
1990s, reshaping a range of social programs
inherited from the post-war generation, espe-
cially those with direct implications for
the labour market such as unemployment
insurance, social assistance and child benefit
programs. The Canadian social policy infra-
structure at the end of the decade was marked-
ly different from that of 1990.
As with all eras of rapid and often
wrenching change, economic transitions and
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policy analysts the decade of the 1990s repre-
sents a laboratory for assessing the conse-
quences of economic and policy changes for
the structure of Canadian society. Admittedly,
the changes of the 1990s and their attendant
impacts are still working their way through
our economic and social systems, and in a real
sense the story of the 1990s is still being writ-
ten. Nevertheless, a new decade and a new
century provide a good vantage point from
which to look back and attempt an initial
assessment of one of the longest decades in
recent Canadian history. This book is devoted
to the task of analysing the impact of eco-
nomic performance on patterns of social well-
being in Canada during the 1990s.
THE TOOLS OF ANALYSIS: 
CONCEPTS AND LINKAGES
Before plunging into all of the contro-
versial debates about the record of the 1990s,
it is important that we establish as much clar-
ity as possible concerning the core concepts at
the heart of the study and the linkages
between them.
The term “economic performance” poses
the fewest difficulties. As used in this volume,
the term is defined relatively narrowly as trends
in key macroeconomic variables such as output
growth, productivity, employment, unem-
ployment and inflation. Economic performance
can be measured in absolute terms or, more
appropriately but with much greater difficulty,
relative to potential. For example, an absolute
slowdown in the long-term rate of economic
growth that reflects slower population growth,
and therefore lower potential growth in the
labour force, does not really represent a deteri-
oration of economic performance as such.
However, a slowdown in actual output growth
relative to potential labour-force and output
growth does. Operationalizing the idea of
potential growth can be complex, because
gauging trend productivity growth is notori-
ously tricky. But the basic concepts are clear.
Good economic performance is thus
defined as a situation in which output,
employment and productivity grow at their
potential and the unemployment rate and the
rate of inflation are low. Poor economic per-
formance is defined as a situation in which
output, employment and productivity growth
are below potential and unemployment and
inflation are unacceptably high.
In contrast with the relative clarity of
the meaning of economic performance, “social
progress” is a much broader idea. Social
progress can be manifested by improvements
in a wide range of measures, including the
incomes of families and individuals, the sense
of economic security enjoyed by workers, the
levels of poverty and social exclusion, the
extent of inequality in life chances, the vibran-
cy of cultural life, the integrity of distinctive
communities, the strength of social cohesion
and the sustainability of our environmental
heritage. Such a complex and multi-faceted
phenomenon is best thought of as an overar-
ching societal goal rather than as an analytical
concept, and contributors to this volume tend
to focus on specific dimensions of our collec-
tive social experience.
Any assessment of social progress is also
hindered by the fact that it must move beyond
aggregate measures. Overall indicators of the
average level of social well-being always mask
variations in the experiences of different indi-
vidual and groups, and this is especially
important during periods of historic transi-
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scale always produces winners and losers,
groups who benefit from the new order and
groups whose economic and social prospects
are eroded by the same forces. The history of
wars, it is often observed, is written by the
winning side. The history of social progress
needs to be more balanced.
As well as being complex, “social
progress” is inevitably a contested idea,
because different people have very different
conceptions of what constitutes the “good”
society. Even if members of a society agree on
whether specific indicators tap dimensions of
social progress, they will differ on the relative
importance to be attached to the various indi-
cators and hence on whether social progress,
in the aggregate, is advancing or not. For
certain indicators, there may even be dis-
agreement about which direction of change
represents social progress, reflecting the ideo-
logical or world view of the observer. For
example, some may see a rising proportion of
students in private schools as a negative indi-
cator because they believe such a trend threat-
ens the development of an inclusive society.
Others may view this as a positive develop-
ment because it means that individuals have
more choice in educational options for their
children. In the end, therefore, it is unlikely
that we will find consensus on a common
measure of social progress or well-being.
Exploring the relationships between econom-
ic performance and social progress remains a
compelling task, but the judgements rendered
in this volume are best seen as contributions
to an open and pluralistic debate on this crit-
ical dimension of Canada’s future.
Not surprisingly, perhaps, the linkages
between these two phenomena — economic
performance and social progress — are many
and varied. In some cases, the links are direct
and immediate; changes in the average
income of Canadians and the level of unem-
ployment are tightly tied to the performance
of the economy and productivity trends in
particular. In other cases, the links are more
indirect and conditioned by other factors. For
example, there is a significant lag between the
performance of the “official” economy, as
measured by such indicators as GDP growth
and average income, and Canadians’ own
sense of economic security, as measured by
opinion polls. Moreover, some commentators
have wondered whether the link between
economic growth and particular components
of social well-being, like poverty for example,
may have weakened over time such that the
return of economic growth late in the decade
did not lead to a sharp decline in poverty
rates. In yet other areas, the link between
changes in economic performance and certain
dimensions of social progress may be espe-
cially weak. For example, there may be little
or no link between economic performance and
indicators of social cohesion or social capital
such as membership in associations and
groups. Cultural or social factors are likely to
exercise much greater influence in shaping
such aspects of our collective social experi-
ences. Finally, the link between economic
performance and social progress may also be
negative. For example, economic growth may
have a deleterious effect on certain environ-
mental indicators such as greenhouse gas
emissions or quality of life indicators such as
the time spent commuting.
The role of public policy highlights the
importance of the indirect linkages between
economic performance and social lives of citi-
zens. In part, the impact of economic per-
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ple, poor economic performance in the 1990s
reduced government revenues and increased
deficits, significantly contributing to the pres-
sure on governments to take dramatic action
on fiscal policy. The major cuts in unemploy-
ment benefits and to a lesser extent in social
assistance triggered by these pressures had a
palpable impact on the lives of many
Canadians. Yet no simple economic deter-
minism drove the reaction of governments. As
the chapters in this volume make clear, gov-
ernments were faced with a variety of options,
and, inevitably, fundamentally political judge-
ments had to be made about how to proceed.
Similarly, an analysis of the evolution of social
programs makes clear that a wide range of
social, demographic and political factors also
came into play in redefining social Canada.
The performance of the economy is a power-
ful factor conditioning public policies, but the
impact is indirect and mediated by political
and social pressures.
Tracing the linkages between the econ-
omy and social well-being is also a challenge
because it is long-term economic performance
that is likely to have the most pervasive
impact. The short-to-medium-term economic
record, such as that of the 1990s, can have
many important consequences, as we will see
in greater detail in a moment. But the most
significant consequences of the performance of
the economy take generations to unfold. One
need not adopt the extreme caution of the
Chinese leader who opined that it was still too
early to assess the impact of the French
Revolution on the course of human history.
But the consequences of economic trends do
need to be measured in generations as well as
decades. Modern research on the importance
of early childhood development, for example,
suggests that changes in the cultural richness
of the family and community environment in
which young children are nurtured can have
long-term effects on their development as
adults. The full consequences of the economic
turbulence of the 1990s will therefore contin-
ue to work their way through our social and
economic systems for a long time. In addition,
long-term economic trends are critical because
they shape and change social norms and pub-
lic expectations of the future. The sustained
economic growth of the post-war decades cer-
tainly contributed to the underlying optimism
of the era and people’s faith in the capacity of
governments to act as instruments of collec-
tive choice and social progress. The more trou-
bled economic record of the last decades of the
20th century undoubtedly played a key role
in eroding that confidence.
Finally, in comparison with the short-
and long-term links running from economic
performance to social progress, the links run-
ning from social well-being to economic per-
formance are less obvious and not as well
documented. Nevertheless, these links are
likely to be important for many economic
variables. To take the most obvious example,
in a knowledge-based economy, social and cul-
tural factors that influence the desire and
capacity of families to invest in their children’s
education and development have potentially
powerful long-term consequences for produc-
tivity growth and the vibrancy of a society’s
economic future; changes in family structures
and other social patterns that influence the
capacity of families and communities to make
such investments do matter. Similarly, many
analysts have argued that the strength of social
networks and levels of social and political trust
represent a form of social capital with impor-
tant implications for economic activity. For
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some evidence that greater social equality can
boost long-term productivity and growth. In
particular, inequality can have negative impli-
cations for the accumulation of human capi-
tal. Those at or near the bottom of the income
distribution in an unequal society may have
much more financial difficulty providing
opportunities for post-secondary education for
their children than a comparable group in a
more equal society.1
The links between economic perform-
ance and social progress are thus multiple and
complex, and tracking the relationships in a
comprehensive way is a challenging analytical
task. Nevertheless, it is possible to make at
least provisional judgements about the core
dynamics at work. What follows is a broad
assessment of these patterns as manifested in
the economic and social record of the 1990s.
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND
SOCIAL PROGRESS IN THE 1990s:
THE BROAD PATTERNS
There is wide agreement that Canada’s
economic performance in the 1990s was, on
average, poor, particularly relative to earlier
decades. Growth in total output, employment
and output per capita were considerably slow-
er than in earlier periods. This slowdown
reflected a gap between actual and potential
performance, but not a drop in potential. The
tragedy of the decade was the unemployment
rate, which reached levels unseen in half a cen-
tury. The only key economic variable that pro-
duced positive results (as traditionally defined)
was inflation, which was very low. As noted
at the outset, economic performance varied
greatly within the decade. The economy went
into a deep and protracted recession, with
declining or weak output and employment
growth along with rising or high unemploy-
ment, in the seven-year period from the 1989
cyclical peak to 1996. This was followed by
robust output and employment growth and
falling unemployment in the four-year period
from 1996 to 2000. However, measures of the
average performance of the economy are influ-
enced more by the first period than by the sec-
ond. Overall, the 1990s were a tough decade
for Canada.
Following a trend started in the 1980s,
the policy climate in Canada in the 1990s
became more market-oriented and less reliant
on state intervention, a development com-
mon to most if not all OECD countries.
Macroeconomic policy was dominated by the
themes of price stability and deficit elimi-
nation. The quest for liberalization drove
policy developments in the trade and
investment area, predominately the Free
Trade Agreement (FTA) in 1989 and the
North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) in 1994. As noted earlier, program
spending as a share of GDP was drastically cut
in the mid-1990s and continued to fall in the
late 1990s even though surpluses emerged.
Labour market policy saw a shift in emphasis
from passive or income-support policies
(Unemployment/ Employment Insurance and
welfare) toward more active policies fostering
the integration of the jobless into the work-
force. The trend away from universality in
income security programs accelerated in the
1990s as income transfers were increasingly
targeted to the poor and middle-income
groups. Governments continued the privati-
zation and deregulation trend started in the
1980s. Unlike the case for earlier decades, it
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(partial exceptions may be child benefits, the
Millennium Fund and spending increases in
programs for Aboriginals).
What, then, of social progress? The
aggregate measures tell one story. The average
incomes of Canadians, however measured,
eroded during the 1990s. For example, real
personal disposable income per capita peaked
in 1989, declined steadily through the first
half of the decade and had not yet fully recov-
ered by the year 2000 (Sharpe 2001). The
decade also saw a growing gap in the standard
of living between Canada and the United
States, where productivity growth was con-
siderably stronger throughout much of the
decade. Aggregate measures of economic secu-
rity capture another dimension of what was a
tough decade for Canadians. As we shall see,
the overall level of economic security enjoyed
by Canadians declined during the 1990s, driv-
en by increases in the risk of unemployment,
the risk of financial insecurity due to illness
and the risk of single-parent poverty.
Income inequality also increased in
Canada in the 1990s. Turbulence and change
in the economy contributed to greater polar-
ization in labour-market outcomes. Based on
trends in the Gini coefficient, a common
measure of income distribution, inequality of
market income for economic families (of two
or more) rose 10.4 percent from 1989 to
1998, the most recent year for which data are
available (Statistics Canada 2000). Moreover,
the traditional role of the State in offsetting
growing inequalities in market income
diminished as the decade proceeded. Overall,
the Gini coefficient for after-tax income rose
somewhat less than that for market income
(7.9 percent). In the first half of the decade,
the tax and transfer system (particularly the
latter) did work to offset the rise of market
income inequality and keep after-tax income
inequality relatively stable. But after 1995
this offsetting effect was weakened as cuts to
social programs (the 1995 reductions in
social assistance benefits in Ontario and the
1996 reform to Employment Insurance stand
out as the most important) significantly
weakened parts of the social safety net.
These economic and social policy
trends inevitably had implications for pover-
ty in terms of incidence, depth and persist-
ence. There is no official measure of poverty
in Canada. However, Statistics Canada does
produce estimates of the proportion of the
population living below what it calls low-
income cut-offs (LICOs), and a number of
non-governmental organizations refer to
these estimates as the poverty rates. By this
measure, the incidence of poverty rose in the
1990s. The proportion of Canadian econom-
ic families living below Statistics Canada’s
LICOs increased from 7.7 percent in 1989 to
a peak of 10.2 percent in 1993, and had fall-
en to only 9.1 percent by 1998, the most
recent year for which data are available
(Statistics Canada 2000). Moreover, the aver-
age income gap, defined as the gap between
the LICO and the average income of a family
living below the LICO, rose 12.0 percent,
from $5,928 to $6,638 ($1998), between
1989 and 1998.
Probing beneath these aggregate trends
reveals a more complex pattern of winners
and losers in the 1990s. Some groups did very
well in the decade while others did quite
poorly. As a general rule, persons with post-
secondary education, older workers, women
and workers in industries with expanding
exports benefited from the changes in the
economic environment, while the poorly edu-
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industries with expanding imports suffered
real setbacks. Although these divergent out-
comes in part reflect the relative degree of
preparedness of these groups to adapt to the
turbulent changes that beset the 1990s, the
causes of some of these labour market trends
are not yet fully understood.
Overall, the 1990s was a tough decade
in social as well as economic terms. Canada
seemed to be headed toward a more unequal
society. However, some observers argue that
the overall level of inequality in Canada is
not the main concern as long as Canadians
maintain a strong commitment to equality
of opportunity. Historically, Canada has been
characterized by a relatively high degree of
intergenerational mobility, ranking along-
side the most mobile countries such as
Sweden and Finland. This pattern of
increased intergenerational mobility over
past decades was undoubtedly underpinned
to a significant degree by the dramatic post-
war expansion of educational systems, espe-
cially post-secondary education, and the
strong public financing that drove that
expansion. We still do not know the extent
to which the policy changes of the 1990s,
which increasingly shifted the costs of post-
secondary education from public to private
shoulders, changed that pattern and began to
reduce the life chances of children from less
affluent families. However, the early warn-
ing signs are not encouraging (Bouchard and
Zao 2000). These signals simply reinforce the
conclusion that the legacy of the adjustments
and turbulence of Canada’s longest decade
will continue to unfold for years to come, and
that the interim report contained in the
pages of this volume will need to be updat-
ed on a continuing basis.
DETAILED VIEWS: THE CHAPTERS
IN THIS VOLUME
The chapters in this volume, written by
leading experts in the field, provide more
detailed views of specific dimensions of the
economic and social developments of the
1990s. The chapters are organized into four
sections dealing with basic concepts, the pub-
lic view of economic and social trends, changes
in key public policies, and the outcomes in
terms of the economic, social and environ-
mental record of the 1990s. This section pro-
vides a brief summary of each chapter.
Concepts, Measurement 
and Linkages
The first chapter in this section, by Lars
Osberg of Dalhousie University, discusses the
concept of social progress and reviews a num-
ber of measures of social progress. The second
chapter, by John Helliwell of the University
of British Columbia, examines the linkages
between social capital and the economy and
well-being.
Lars Osberg was given the daunting
task of examining the conceptual issues
involved in defining and measuring social
progress as well as reviewing the indicators
currently available. As the author points out
in his introduction, while much was made
of the fact that Canada yet again earned
first place in the United Nations’ Human
Development Index last year, other indices
have produced less stellar results. He cites,
for example, our 31st-place ranking based on
the Weighted Index of Social Progress
(WISP). Osberg’s point is that there exists a
wide range of similar indices, and each is
based on a different set of criteria reflecting
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ure of social progress presumes some prior
conception of “good” outcomes and some
way of knowing whether society is progress-
ing overall in that direction.
Modern pluralist societies, however,
have no common benchmark for defining the
“good” society. Therefore, Osberg argues,
social progress in a liberal society must be
measured in the “enabling” sense that a soci-
ety progresses when it enables more of its cit-
izens to achieve the kind of life they personally
value. Moreover, he insists on the need to draw
a distinction between needs and wants and to
think of progress in terms of “first meeting
needs and then satisfying wants.” His central
argument is that if individuals are to choose
freely what they want, their basic human
rights need to be met. Canadian society has
already committed itself to a definition of such
rights in signing and ratifying a series of inter-
national covenants such as the United Nations
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(1948) and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966).
One measure of social progress in Canada
would therefore be the percentage of
Canadians who actually now enjoy these basic
human rights. Using the right to housing as
an example, Osberg also emphasises the fact
that human rights covenants explicitly recog-
nize the interdependence of social, economic,
legal and political rights. The chapter goes on
to discuss some of the empirical difficulties
involved in constructing a measure of the
attainment of social and economic rights, and
it reviews several quantitative indices of social
progress through the prism of human rights.
The author concludes by highlighting the
problems associated with data based on aggre-
gate measures (e.g., population means or
totals), which cannot reveal the particular cir-
cumstances of minorities. He also warns of the
dangers of excessive complexity in data pro-
cessing, which can at times obscure the link
to human rights.
In the second chapter in this section,
John Helliwell provides an up-to-date and
comprehensive survey of the literature on the
impact of social capital on both the economy
and well-being. He begins by defining social
capital as the networks and norms that facili-
tate cooperative activities within groups
(bonding social capital) and between groups
(bridging social capital). Researchers have
found that high levels of interpersonal trust
make many aspects of life more enjoyable and
more productive by reducing the costs of deal-
ing with risk and uncertainty. He points out
that the direct linkages running from social
capital to well-being are better documented
than indirect linkages running from social
capital to better economic performance and
then to greater well-being. He also notes that
it is important to disentangle what social cap-
ital is from what it does. Trust and the effec-
tiveness of institutions may be better thought
of as consequences of social capital than as part
of social capital narrowly defined.
Helliwell surveys a number of studies
that show that social capital actually saves
lives. The denser the social network to which
one belongs, the better the health outcomes,
with the causation running from the former
to the latter. Education levels have been found
to be the most consistent factor in explaining
differences in connectedness and trust, which,
according to Helliwell, is a powerful result
that broadens the total returns to investment
in education. The author also surveys the lit-
erature on subjective well-being, pointing out
that unemployment lowers subjective well-
8
Keith Banting, Andrew Sharpe and 
France St-Hilaire
mission, table matiŁres final.qxd  22/05/01  5:11 PM  Page 8being by more than the usual measure of eco-
nomic cost and certainly more than inflation.
This implies that estimates of the trade-off
between inflation and unemployment should
attach substantially more weight to unem-
ployment than that implied by the “misery
index” which treats as equivalent a one-per-
centage point increase in the rate of inflation
and a one-percentage point increase in the
unemployment rate.2
A key issue in the debate on well-being
is whether it is absolute or relative values for
income, education and social capital that influ-
ence happiness or well-being. According to
Helliwell, the literature concludes that the
happiness effect of higher income is based on
relative rather than absolute income. In con-
trast, it is absolute levels of education and
social capital that influence well-being. He
argues that one interpretation of these results
is that education and social capital have posi-
tive externalities while income has negative
externalities. That is to say, the overall popu-
lation gains from contact with the more edu-
cated and civic-minded. In contrast, when
others have higher income it exposes the infe-
riority of one’s own income and reduces sub-
jective well-being.
Public Views of Economic
Performance and Social
Progress
The second section of the volume turns
to the public’s view of the experience of the
1990s. Frank Graves, of Ekos Research
Associates, examines the relationship between
what he describes as the “official economy,” as
portrayed by conventional measures of eco-
nomic performance, and public perceptions of
the state of the economy. He also considers the
public’s understanding of the relationship
between economic and social well-being, and
the linkages between the public’s perception
of economic performance and their attitudes
toward the redistributive role of the State and
its broader role as an instrument of social
progress. The analysis in this chapter is based
on data from quantitative surveys and evi-
dence from qualitative focus groups conduct-
ed over the past decade.
One of Graves’ main arguments is that
although there is a strong relationship
between the perceived and official economy,
the relationship is lagged and imperfect. As
the author points out, this was particularly the
case in the mid-1990s when the economy was
perceived not only as considerably more tur-
bulent than it was, but also as failing to recov-
er at a time when the official data on economic
growth indicated a turnaround. While public
perceptions are highly segmented on the basis
of region and socio-economic status, Graves
also provides a number of other explanations
for the imperfect nature of the relationship.
For instance, he finds that people’s perceptions
about the state of the Canadian economy are
very much based on their personal experience,
which does not necessarily correspond with
macroeconomic indicators. In addition, the
experience of the mid-1990s clearly shows
that once feelings of economic insecurity and
anxiety toward the future take hold, they are
more difficult to reverse than feelings of con-
fidence. Indeed, it was only after a sustained
period of strong performance in the Canadian
economy and solid evidence of improvement
in the state of public finances that indices of
public insecurity and confidence levels moved
in the expected direction.
By the end of the decade, not only had
Canadians finally caught up with the data, but
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nificant shift in attitudes on the part of
Canadians toward globalization, technology
and trade liberalization, and greater accept-
ance of the changes these forces entail. Yet at
the same time they are increasingly concerned
by what they perceive as rising poverty levels
and growing inequality.
According to the author, Canadians
understand and explicitly rank social and
economic well-being considerations. Most
people see “social well-being,” which they
equate with the notion of overall quality of
life, as the ultimate goal. Graves also reports
a growing tendency to explicitly link eco-
nomic and social well-being and a desire to
find ways to reconcile the two. Based on
these observations, it is not surprising to
find that public expectations and attitudes
toward the role of government have also
undergone important adjustments. Graves
argues that economic performance clearly
influences attitudes toward redistribution
but that the linkage is different at the indi-
vidual and aggregate/macro levels. At the
individual level, those with high incomes
will tend to place less emphasis on redistri-
bution. At the collective level, however,
Canadians have shown rising support for
“conditional government activism” to
address issues of social well-being as the
economy has strengthened and perceptions
of “needs” in specific policy areas such as
health care have emerged. Looking at pub-
lic opinion trends on the role of government
and its priorities, Graves foresees the emer-
gence of what he calls a new “humanomic”
approach that is “redefining the relationship
between economic and social policy as com-
ponents of an overall plan to increase oppor-




The next set of chapters explores the
impact of changes in public policy on eco-
nomic performance and social well-being dur-
ing the 1990s. The editors identified three
policy areas as particularly important in shap-
ing social progress in the 1990s: macroeco-
nomic policy, trade policy and social policy.
We invited individuals who were either play-
ers in these policy decisions or were persons
deeply engaged in the attendant public debate
to contribute chapters to this section. Four
chapters examine the broad patterns of macro-
economic policy, while two others are devot-
ed to trade policy and social policy, with
particular reference to income security.
Macroeconomic policy. Monetary and fiscal
policy were at the heart of the public policy
debate in this country in the 1990s. Indeed,
policy decisions in these areas affecting the
state of the economy and the allocation of gov-
ernment resources had a profound impact on
all aspects of Canadian society and provoked
intense controversy. The four chapters on this
general topic, two on monetary policy and two
on fiscal policy, provide quite different per-
spectives from authors who are veterans of
macroeconomic policy debates. Two are con-
tributed by senior economic policy-makers
and two by well-known critics of macroeco-
nomic policy.
In the first chapter on monetary policy,
Paul Jenkins and Brian O’Reilly of the Bank
of Canada survey monetary policy develop-
ments in the 1990s, focusing on links between
monetary policy and the economic well-being
of Canadians. In the second, Pierre Fortin of
the Université du Québec à Montréal provides
a critique of the conduct of Canadian mone-
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developed throughout the decade. In the first
chapter on fiscal policy, Don Drummond, who
was until recently a senior official in the fed-
eral Department of Finance with responsibil-
ity for budget coordination, gives his
perspective on fiscal developments in the
1990s. This is followed by a chapter by Jim
Stanford of the Canadian Auto Workers
(CAW), who has a different take on this topic.
Macroeconomic trends and policy devel-
opments in the 1990s are well known and the
basic facts are not in dispute. In the late
1980s, under the leadership of John Crow, the
Bank of Canada adopted price stability as its
primary objective. This policy was formalized
in February 1991 with the announcement of
a Bank of Canada-Department of Finance
agreement on inflation targets. With the
tightening of labour markets in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, a restrictive monetary policy
was adopted to dampen incipient inflationary
pressures. Short-term interest rates surged and
at one point were 4 percentage points above
comparable rates in the United States.
Inflation was duly subdued, but economic
growth slumped and failed to revive. From
1989 to 1993, real GDP growth averaged 0.4
percent per year; it was by far the weakest
four-year period of economic growth since the
Great Depression.
The stagnant economy and high inter-
est rates had very negative effects on govern-
ment fiscal balances. Governments eventually
reacted to their burgeoning deficits by cutting
program spending and to a lesser degree rais-
ing taxes. According to OECD measures,
Canada pursued the most restrictive fiscal
policies among all OECD countries in the
mid-1990s. This action in turn reduced
growth and the economy continued to per-
form well below potential. Finally, starting in
1997 the worst of the government cuts had
been absorbed, interest rates declined and the
American economy went into high gear.
Canada now entered a period of rapid growth
that reversed much of the decline experienced
in the first half of the decade. The unemploy-
ment rate fell dramatically, the gap between
actual and potential growth was reduced if not
eliminated, and budget surpluses emerged.
The key issues in the debate on macro-
economic policy are the following:
> To what degree was the recession of the
early 1990s exclusively due to monetary
policy as opposed to other factors such
as restructuring of the economy?
> Did the federal government overreact to
the fiscal situation and pursue an unnec-
essarily harsh fiscal policy to the detri-
ment of the economic well-being of
Canadians?
> To what degree was the economic boom
starting in 1997 a direct result of the
monetary and fiscal policies pursued in
the first half of the decade, with low
inflation and falling deficits essential
preconditions to interest rate reductions,
and enhanced business and consumer
confidence?
The four chapters in the section offer
different answers to these questions. In refer-
ence to the first question, the Bank of Canada
economists do admit that tight monetary pol-
icy in the early 1990s hurt growth in the
short term, but they argue that such action
was necessary to ratchet down entrenched
inflationary expectations. Moreover, they
argue that stagnation in the early part of the
decade was not simply the result of monetary
policy, but also reflected a weak US economy
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view. While not denying that the US eco-
nomic slowdown in the early 1990s reduced
growth in Canada, he lays the blame for the
inferior economic performance of the
Canadian economy relative to the US econo-
my squarely on the Bank of Canada, and dis-
misses structural explanations of the recession
as lacking an empirical basis.
In response to the second question, Don
Drummond makes the case that, given the
context at the time, the fiscal policy imple-
mented in the mid-1990s was justified. With
large deficits, there was little room for the
Bank of Canada to reduce interest rates to
stimulate the economy and generate revenues.
It was imperative that the deficit be elimi-
nated. Tax rates were already high, so the
government had no choice but to cut program
spending. Drummond recognizes that the
cuts caused hardship for some Canadians, but
feels that the suffering was relatively limited
and temporary in nature. Jim Stanford agrees
with Drummond that measures were needed
to eliminate the deficit, but he argues that the
federal government’s spending cuts were larg-
er than necessary and caused real pain in
many areas of Canadian life. He shows that a
strategy in which program spending is frozen
in nominal terms, but not cut, would have
produced more growth and employment and
still yielded almost the same deficit by 1999
(although with slightly higher debt levels) as
the program-cutting path actually followed.
Probably the most controversial of the
three questions is the third one. The Bank of
Canada makes the case that although estab-
lishing a low-inflation environment generat-
ed short-term pain in the early 1990s, it is
now paying off with long-term gain.
According to the Bank, price stability has
enhanced economic well-being. Low inflation
has reduced inflation uncertainty, a boon to
investment. Don Drummond argues that the
elimination of the deficit has reduced risk pre-
miums and allowed the Bank of Canada to
bring interest rates down.
Both Fortin and Stanford give less cred-
it to monetary and fiscal policies adopted in
the first half of the decade for the economic
renaissance of the second half. They note that
over the decade economic growth was very
weak and that four good years cannot offset
the negative effect of six poor years. Both
authors agree that the conduct of monetary
policy has become more conducive to growth
in recent years and point to the willingness of
the Bank of Canada to allow the dollar to fall
as a positive development. But they both
argue that the virtues of price stability have
been oversold and that a less rigid approach to
monetary policy, such as the strategy practised
so successfully by Alan Greenspan, would be
more productive.
Trade policy. Daniel Schwanen of the
Institute for Research on Public Policy
addresses the impact of the major trade liber-
alization efforts undertaken by Canada and its
trading partners beginning with the Canada-
US Free Trade Agreement in 1989. The
author focuses in particular on the question of
whether liberalized trade could have been a
factor behind the emergence of greater
inequalities in Canada in the 1990s. He
begins by reviewing some theoretical links
between trade and inequality, and notes that
trade can affect the relative position of
unskilled workers not only through “factor
price equalization” — for example, competi-
tion of unskilled Canadian workers with
lower-paid workers in other countries — but
also because trade fosters scale and innovation.
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favour skilled over less-skilled workers.
The author divides Canadian manufac-
turing industries into five groups according
to their sensitivity to trade liberalization in
the 1990s and to the direction taken by
exports and imports following the opening of
trade. He finds that workers in export-ori-
ented manufacturing industries did marked-
ly better than others during the period in
terms of employment and earnings, while
workers in industries characterized by high
levels of imports, who were less educated and
already earning less on average before the
FTA, did poorly. Schwanen notes that trade
liberalization is more likely to have affected
services indirectly than directly, through the
inputs that services provide to manufactur-
ing. Accordingly, he divides service industries
into those that are highly sensitive to two-
way trade and those that are not. He finds
that employees in trade-sensitive service
industries, who were already earning higher
wages and were more highly educated than
the Canadian average, experienced a greater
rise in their employment and earnings rela-
tive to workers in other service industries. At
the same time, workers in the least trade-sen-
sitive service industries (many in the public
sector) who were also highly educated, and
who comprised a high proportion of youth,
experienced relatively poor outcomes.
Schwanen concludes from this exercise
that more open trade may have contributed to
inequalities in Canada by favouring certain
groups already doing relatively well while
being detrimental to many less-skilled and
lesser-paid groups. Furthermore, he notes that
liberalized trade may help explain the fact that
increases in inequality have also been observed
within groups of workers with equivalent edu-
cation and experience. This is because groups
of industries employing workers with similar
characteristics nevertheless performed differ-
ently, depending on their exposure to trade
liberalization.
Social policy. Perhaps one of the most
highly charged public debate in this country
over the past decade has been that concerning
the dismantling of the “universalist” model of
the “welfare state” adopted in the post-war
years. In his chapter, Ken Battle of the
Caledon Institute of Social Policy is critical of
the ongoing public discourse on this issue,
which he considers lacking in both substance
and subtlety. He argues that this has led to a
polarization of views and produced persistent
mythologies, which have insulated govern-
ments from effective criticism and inhibited
an open and informed public debate on the
present and future course of social policy. As
one of the country’s leading experts on social
policy, Battle is well placed to provide a com-
prehensive analysis of the major developments
in income security policy in Canada since the
mid-1980s. He documents the changes in
approaches and instruments, identifies the
forces propelling these changes, and assesses
the outcomes relative to the broad principles
and objectives of social policy.
The first section of the chapter charts
the trends in major income security expendi-
tures since 1980. On the whole, income secu-
rity expenditures in the 1990s show a
relatively small downward trend in both
absolute and relative terms, although provin-
cial spending fell more sharply (13.2 percent
in real terms between 1993-94 and 1998-99)
than federal spending (3.8 percent over the
same period). But underlying this modest
trend are important differences in individual
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erly continued to grow, unemployment insur-
ance and social assistance expenditures moved
up and down erratically as a result of both
economic turmoil and changes in benefits and
eligibility requirements imposed by cash-
strapped governments.
According to Battle, the pressures to
reform Canada’s social programs stem from a
variety of profound changes that extend well
beyond the economic realm. He argues that
the shift away from a universalist model of the
welfare state is not a 1990s phenomenon, but
one that can be traced back to the late 1970s
and is still under way. Battle goes on to
describe how social, demographic, political
and ideological forces, often interacting with
economic factors, are setting the course in the
ongoing transformation of Canadian social
policy. In his view, the series of changes and
reforms implemented in the policies and pro-
grams related to income security over the last
two decades reflect the emergence of a new
conceptual framework which he describes as
the “post-welfare state” model. This new
model, as he defines it, retains the fundamen-
tal objectives of social policy but seeks new
approaches and mechanisms related to finan-
cial sustainability, efficiency and effectiveness
in order to adapt the old model to the chang-
ing economic, social and political realities of
the new century.
Battle also makes clear that, while eco-
nomic concerns have always been an aspect of
social policy, they are “front and centre” in the
post-welfare state. He identifies several key
characteristics of this new approach to social
policy, emphasising: (1) the replacement of
universal social programs and needs-tested
income security programs with broad-based
and progressive income-testing, (2) a greater
concern for the work-disincentive effects of
social programs such as the effects of clawback
provisions for social benefits and the welfare
wall, (3) a greater integration of social pro-
grams and the tax system, (4) efforts to find a
balance between “passive” and “active” social
programs such as training or various preven-
tive measures, and (5) attempts to measure the
outcomes of social policy and provide greater
accountability.
The chapter goes on to describe the
major changes to social benefits and the extent
of program coverage. The limits that were
imposed, both directly through tightened eli-
gibility requirements (e.g., Employment
Insurance and social assistance) and indirectly
through the partial de-indexation of various
benefits (e.g., earnings supplements, the Child
Tax Benefit) and tax credits (e.g., the GST and
other refundable tax credits), have consider-
ably reduced the size of the qualifying popu-
lation relative to what it would have been.
However, Battle places the most
emphasis on the changes to several income
security programs that could be considered
universal in the sense of not imposing income-
based qualifying conditions and which over
years have been reformed in that direction
(e.g., Old Age Security and child benefits). He
considers the displacement of demogrants
(available to all) and needs-tested benefits by
income-tested benefits delivered through the
income tax system to be the most important
advance in contemporary Canadian social pol-
icy. In addressing some of the criticisms of this
approach, he argues that the large majority of
families with children and seniors still receive
benefits and that the changes have resulted in
greater vertical equity overall. Battle also
stresses the importance of the National Child
Benefit in removing children from social assis-
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step forward in the essential task of disman-
tling social assistance and replacing it with
more effective programs.”
Battle describes the general process of
reform and developments in social policy in
the last two decades as one of “relentless
incrementalism” where cumulative, purpose-
ful and patterned change has produced a sub-
stantial shift in the structure of the Canadian
income security system. He argues that this
shift has occurred partly by stealth but also
because Canadians had come to accept the
need to deal with the chronic problems of
public finances and were receptive to the crit-
icisms directed at major social programs. The
author concludes that in the end the emerg-
ing post-welfare state will better serve
Canada’s evolving social, economic and polit-
ical needs. In particular, he sees little cause
for continuing nostalgia over the fading uni-
versalist welfare state, which in his estimation




The final section of the volume turns
more directly to the economic, social and
environmental outcomes of the 1990s in
Canada. The first chapter examines trends
over the decade in various components of
economic well-being. The second chapter
provides a comprehensive overview of distri-
butional changes during that period and the
third chapter looks at long-term trends in
intergenerational mobility. The final chapter
analyses the relationship between economic
growth and environmental degradation.
Lars Osberg of Dalhousie University
and Andrew Sharpe of the Centre for the
Study of Living Standards provide an overview
of trends in a number of dimensions of eco-
nomic well-being (consumption flows, stocks
of wealth, income equality and economic secu-
rity). They assess these trends through the lens
of the Index of Economic Well-Being, a new
composite measure developed by the Centre
for the Study of Living Standards. In modern
democracies, the authors point out, national
systems of social and economic statistics have
become a crucial part of the informational
feedback loop of public policy. Through meas-
ures of social and economic outcomes, statis-
tical agencies provide decision-makers and
voters with the information that often defines
the success or failure of public policies. The
motivation for the development of the Index
is the belief that current measures — such as
trends in per capita income — may not nec-
essarily be a good guide to popular perceptions
of trends in economic well-being.
The main findings of the article are that
after registering increases in the 1970s and
1980s, the Index declined in absolute terms
in the 1990s. This development was largely
driven by the fall in the economic security
component of the Index. Two of the four sub-
components of economic security experienced
significant declines. The risk from unemploy-
ment increased dramatically, reflecting the
falling employment rate and, more impor-
tantly, the decline in the share of the unem-
ployed covered by Unemployment Insurance
(renamed Employment Insurance in 1996).
The risk to financial security from illness, as
proxied by the proportion of disposable
income devoted to medical expenses, rose con-
siderably, in part due to delisting of a number
of medical services and higher drug prices. A
decline in the equality component of the Index
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stocks components increased, although at a
slower pace than in earlier periods.
The time path of the Index was not one
of continuous decline over the decade. Rather,
the Index fell steadily from 1989 throughout
the first half of the 1990s, hitting a trough in
1996. Since then, the Index has been on an
upward trend.
Osberg and Sharpe point out that the
determinants of the nearly 20 variables that
make up the Index are complex. Certain vari-
ables have been strongly influenced by poor
economic performance in Canada in the
1990s, some have been moderately influenced
and, finally, some are largely independent of
current economic performance in Canada (but
not necessarily economic performance in other
countries), because they are driven by either
longer-run social trends or discretionary poli-
cy choices. But, overall, the authors conclude
that there has been a direct link between the
deterioration of economic performance in this
country in the 1990s and the overall state of
economic well-being.
The following chapter examines trends
in earnings and income inequality in Canada.
Andrew Heisz of Statistics Canada, Andrew
Jackson of the Canadian Council on Social
Development and Garnett Picot of Statistics
Canada provide a comprehensive analysis of
the distributional changes that have occurred
in the 1990s as well as useful comparative per-
spectives in terms of both trends over time and
the situation here relative to that in the
United States. This exercise is all the more
important given the significant changes and
developments that have taken place in the
labour market and the economy at large over
the last decade. Indeed, there has been grow-
ing concern over the repercussions of these
changes on Canadian society and the percep-
tion of increased polarization and a growing
gap between the haves and the have-nots.
The story is a complex one that depends
on which definition of income is used and
whether the focus is on individuals or families.
And, as this chapter shows, it also requires a
thorough examination of the shifts beneath
aggregate trends. In other words, the real story
is to a great extent buried in the subtext. The
authors focus on four aspects of distribution
outcomes: (1) earnings and income inequali-
ty, (2) the relative earnings of the young and
old and the more and less educated, (3) the
changing relative position of men and women,
and (4) changes in low-income trends in
Canada during the 1990s.
Looking at long-term aggregate trends,
the data indicate that earnings inequality,
which had risen significantly in Canada
between the 1970s and the 1980s, increased
only modestly during the 1990s. Earnings
inequality among men increased to a lesser
extent in the 1990s than it had in the two pre-
vious decades, and even improved slightly
between 1997 and 1998, while the changes
among women were more muted. When earn-
ings are aggregated at the family level, how-
ever, inequality is seen as continuing to rise in
the 1990s. According to the authors, the dif-
ference between individual and family earn-
ings is directly related to changes in marriage
and family formation patterns and, in partic-
ular, the growing numbers of single-parent
families and an increasing tendency for high
earners to marry high earners and low earners
to marry low earners.
The measure of inequality in family dis-
posable income is of particular relevance to
policy-makers as it reflects the distribution of
total monetary income from all sources,
16
Keith Banting, Andrew Sharpe and 
France St-Hilaire
mission, table matiŁres final.qxd  22/05/01  5:11 PM  Page 16including pensions, social transfers and
investment income, and also takes into
account personal income taxes. Interestingly,
there appears to have been little change in
this measure of inequality over the past 30
years. According to the authors, the earnings
losses among low-income families through-
out this period (and especially in the 1980s)
were largely offset by increases in social trans-
fer payments. Although data for recent years
do suggest that some increase in disposable
income inequality may have taken place, it is
not yet clear whether this is related to cut-
backs in some social programs in the 1990s
or to changes in data collection methods over
this period.
Of course, the apparent stability in some
of the aggregate measures of inequality over
the last decade masks important shifts and off-
setting changes in the relative wages of vari-
ous groups as well as within groups. For
instance, the authors point to a widening earn-
ings gap between younger and older male
workers in the 1980s and 1990s, mainly as a
result of the fall in the real earnings of young
male workers (under 35). As the chapter sug-
gests, the causes of this deterioration remain
somewhat of a puzzle and even raise questions
about the skill-biased technological change
hypothesis and the resulting demand for
skilled labour as a primary driving force
behind the recent changes in the labour mar-
ket outcomes of Canadian workers. For
instance, there appears to have been no signif-
icant change in relative wages or employment
rates among more highly educated workers as
a whole in Canada throughout the 1980s and
up to the mid-1990s. In fact, the situation was
more one of deteriorating outcomes for the
least educated. The latest data from the Labour
Force Survey, however, do indicate that the
earnings of young university-educated work-
ers have increased in recent years, both in real
terms and relative to the less educated.
The real success story in Heisz, Jackson
and Picot’s account of distributional outcomes
over the past two decades is the dramatic
improvement in the labour market position
of women relative to men. As the authors
report, women have experienced gains on
almost all fronts, including significant
increases in educational attainment, labour-
force participation and employment rates, and
a narrowing of the male-female wage gap as
women’s earnings rose more rapidly than
men’s in the first half of the 1990s. In both
the likelihood of being employed and the
likelihood of being unemployed, women’s
outcomes have improved considerably while
those of men have deteriorated.
This chapter also provides an overview
of low-income trends. The figures show that
the low-income rate, which essentially mir-
rored cyclical changes in unemployment
throughout the 1980s and at least up to 1994,
continued to rise to a peak in 1996 (four years
after the end of the recession) despite improv-
ing labour markets, and had not recovered by
1998. According to the authors, the increase
in the low-income rate over the 1988-98 peri-
od can be attributed almost entirely to
declines in employment earnings among fam-
ilies. Moreover, as they point out, social trans-
fers did not offset these earnings declines as
they had in the 1980s. The low-income gap
(defined as the difference between Statistics
Canada’s low-income cut-off and the average
income of low-income individuals and fami-
lies), which had fallen steadily and signifi-
cantly following the recession in the early
1980s, increased sharply after 1989 and con-
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gap stemmed from both lower social benefits
and employment earnings received by low-
income families.
The issue of child poverty has been a
dominant theme of the social policy debate in
Canada for well over a decade. During the
1990s, however, the concern over this prob-
lem has shifted from simply a desire to reduce
the incidence of child poverty to a broader
awareness of its potential long-term conse-
quences not only for the children currently
affected, but for subsequent generations as
well. These broader concerns have emerged as
a result of the rapidly growing body of theory
and evidence on the potential role of the “envi-
ronment” in all of its complexity, including
family structure, socio-economic status, neigh-
bourhood and community, in predicting adult
outcomes. These various factors can have a
determining influence on early childhood
development and subsequent readiness to
learn, as well as on education and labour mar-
ket outcomes later in life. One of the central
issues in this debate is the nature of the rela-
tionship between family characteristics, in par-
ticular family income, and the long-term
outcomes of children. As Miles Corak of
Statistics Canada argues in the introduction to
his chapter, an understanding of the extent of
intergenerational mobility and the mecha-
nisms that bring it about is of great impor-
tance for policy-makers. It has implications for
education, health care, immigration policy and
early childhood investment.
Corak’s chapter provides an overview of
the state of knowledge in this area and, most
importantly, reveals the complexity of the
factors at play and the gaps in our under-
standing of the underlying causes and effects.
According to the author, Canadian society is
characterized by a relatively high degree of
intergenerational mobility — high enough to
suggest that “being raised by a low-income
parent does not pre-ordain children to a low-
income adulthood.” Indeed, Canada ranks
among the most mobile advanced economies
along with Sweden and Finland and has a
degree of intergenerational mobility two to
three times that of the United States. In gen-
eral, international comparisons indicate that
countries with a high degree of intergenera-
tional mobility tend to have low rates of
income inequality and child poverty. Canada
differs in this regard, in that the incidence of
child poverty reported is more akin to that of
the least mobile countries such as the United
States and the United Kingdom (although the
use of an absolute as opposed to relative meas-
ure of poverty does improve our ranking). A
further important point highlighted by Corak
is that the pattern of intergenerational mobil-
ity varies across the income distribution. The
degree of mobility, which is high at the lower
end of the income distribution, declines to a
moderate level further up the lower half of the
distribution and then rises again over the
upper half before reaching almost complete
immobility at the very top.
Corak finds that, except for those fami-
lies who are very well off and able to transfer
wealth to their children, the primary way in
which families might influence the future eco-
nomic status of their children is indirectly
through financial and non-financial invest-
ments in their overall capacity to succeed in
the labour market. He notes that various mod-
els of human capital investment might help
explain the patterns of intergenerational
mobility observed, pointing to the potential
link between the financial capacity of parents
and access to higher education and the more
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education levels, which bring other factors
into play such as parental expectations and
non-monetary investments. On the first issue,
Corak finds little direct evidence on whether
or not Canadian youths are being denied access
to post-secondary education due to financial
constraints, although it is evident that the pat-
tern of increased intergenerational mobility in
Canada over the past decades does coincide
with the significant expansion of post-second-
ary education and public financial support. As
for the quality of the environment in which
young children are raised, and its impact on
their development and long-term outcomes,
Corak stresses that there is very little solid evi-
dence about how this process plays out and in
particular to what extent it is related to fami-
ly income. As a result, he concludes, it is dif-
ficult to gauge the effectiveness of government
policy based on long-term productivity argu-
ments, and it may be that the best argument
for initiatives aimed at child poverty and other
related programs is the actual benefits pro-
vided to the children involved.
Finally, in the last chapter of the volume
Kathleen Day and Quentin Grafton of the
University of Ottawa explore the relationship
between the economy and the environment.
One perspective sees economic growth lead-
ing to environmental degradation by impos-
ing stresses on limited natural resources and
ecosystems and by increasing emissions of pol-
lutants. A second perspective argues that the
opposite relationship holds. Economic growth,
once a certain level is achieved, leads to a
cleaner environment, as higher incomes shift
societal preferences toward better environ-
mental quality and at the same time provide
the resources necessary to achieve this goal. In
addition, it is argued that economic growth is
increasingly service-based, “decoupling” pol-
lution from economic activity.
The authors examine the relationship
between economic growth and environmen-
tal degradation in Canada. They point out
that Canada faces a number of environmental
challenges, including climate and atmos-
pheric change, species loss, degradation of
ecosystems and depletion of renewable natural
resources, and that these challenges are driven
by human activity in terms of consumption
patterns, production processes and waste dis-
posal. Day and Grafton use an econometric
model to relate per capita income to 10 meas-
ures of environmental degradation in Canada
over the past several decades. They find that
economic growth has not itself reduced
environmental degradation, as the second
approach outlined above suggests. The impli-
cation of their findings is that economic
growth does not necessarily resolve environ-
mental problems. This does not mean that
further economic growth is irreconcilable
with the sustainability of the environment,
but it does mean that public policy, at both
the national and international level, must play
a key role in balancing the needs of the envi-
ronment with those of the economy.
CONCLUSIONS
The relationship between economic per-
formance and social progress in Canada in the
1990s is complex and multi-faceted, as
demonstrated by the chapters in this volume.
Nevertheless, one message does stand out. The
poor economic performance of the 1990s, as
evidenced by high unemployment rates and
slow growth in real income, had a major
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buys advances in all areas of social progress, it
is critical in a number of important areas such
as poverty, economic security and consump-
tion. There is little doubt that the longest
decade would have felt considerably shorter
had economic performance been better.
As stated earlier, the relationship
between economic performance and certain
measures of social progress may vary over
time. Some observers have noted that eco-
nomic growth and falling unemployment in
the second half of the 1990s do not appear to
have significantly reduced the poverty rate
and have expressed concern that poverty
reduction may have become “decoupled”
from economic growth. Unfortunately, data
on low-income trends are currently available
only to 1998 so we do not yet know the
impact of recent strong growth on poverty.
Therefore, it is too early to make a judge-
ment on the decoupling issue. A further pos-
sibility, which should also be investigated, is
that previous cuts to social programs may
have offset the effect economic growth might
have had on the earnings of low-income
families in the late 1990s. As we have seen,
Canada’s social policy infrastructure has
undergone considerable change over the last
decade, and in many ways the real test of the
new regime will be how it performs through
the next economic downturn.
Clearly, the impact of the poor eco-
nomic performance and the key policy deci-
sions of the 1990s is still being felt, and the
repercussions are likely to continue to unfold
for some time into the future. From this per-
spective, judgements on the effects of the
1990s must be considered interim ones.
Indeed, the long-term consequences may be
more important than those in the short term.
Future contributors to the Review of Economic
Performance and Social Progress will be invited
to explore these issues.
NOTES
1 See Fortin, Sharpe and St-Hilaire (forthcoming) for
a collection of papers exploring various dimensions
of the linkages between economic growth and
inequality. The papers are drawn from the IRPP-
CSLS conference on this topic held in January
2001 in Ottawa. The conference papers are post-
ed at www.csls.ca and www.irpp.org
2 The index simply adds the rate of unemploy-
ment to the rate of inflation thus treating them
as equivalent.
REFERENCES
Bouchard, B., and J. Zao. 2000. “University
Education: Recent Trends in Participation,
Accessibility and Returns.” Education Quarterly
Review 6(4):24-32.
Fortin, P., A. Sharpe and F. St-Hilaire. Forthcoming.
The Linkages Between Economic Growth and Inequality.
Special issue of Canadian Public Policy.
Sharpe, A. 2001. “Determinants of Trends in Living
Standards in Canada and the United States, 1989-
2000.” International Productivity Monitor 2:3-10.
Statistics Canada. 2000, June. Income in Canada, 1998.
Catalogue #75-202-XPE. Ottawa: Statistics Canada.
20
Keith Banting, Andrew Sharpe and 
France St-Hilaire
mission, table matiŁres final.qxd  22/05/01  5:11 PM  Page 20